Verify the enclave

"Solrouter says my prompt is opened only inside an enclave. How do I know that is true?"

You do not have to take our word for it. Your device seals every prompt to the enclave's public key. The enclave publishes that key together with a quote signed by Intel TDX hardware, and the key is bound into the quote. This page checks the binding, then points you at Intel's signature and at the Solana receipt for a single call.

Check 1: the enclave key

In words

• Your browser fetches GET https://api.solrouter.com/tee/attestation.
• It reads the quote header: version 4 and TEE type 0x81 mean an Intel TDX quote.
• It computes sha256(teePublicKey) and compares it with reportDataHex.
• It computes sha512("app-data:" || reportData) and compares it with the 64 bytes of report_data at byte 568 of the quote.
• All three passing means the key you seal to is the key named inside this quote, not a key swapped in by a machine in the middle.

This check does not verify Intel's signature on the quote. Step 3 below does.

Check it by hand

curl -s https://api.solrouter.com/tee/attestation > att.json

// node check.mjs
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';

const a = JSON.parse(readFileSync('att.json', 'utf8'));
const quote = Buffer.from(a.tdxQuote.quote, 'hex');

const keyHash = createHash('sha256').update(Buffer.from(a.teePublicKey, 'base64')).digest('hex');
const bound = createHash('sha512')
  .update(Buffer.concat([Buffer.from(`${a.tdxQuote.prefix}:`), Buffer.from(a.reportDataHex, 'hex')]))
  .digest('hex');
const inQuote = quote.subarray(568, 632).toString('hex');

console.log('TDX v4 quote:', quote.readUInt16LE(0) === 4 && quote.readUInt32LE(4) === 0x81);
console.log('sha256(key) == reportDataHex:', keyHash === a.reportDataHex);
console.log('report_data bound:', bound === inQuote);

Check 2: the receipt for one sealed call

Each sealed call writes a Light Protocol compressed attestation to Solana under program ATMRatMtsKX4bHax7U4FRdhbE4mjU4NKpDZGqZqAhBKb. Inside the enclave, a signing key that exists nowhere else signs the hash of your exact ciphertext. The backend pays for the transaction but cannot produce that signature.

Paste a receipt address, a transaction signature, or the 64-character hash of a ciphertext. A POST /tee/process reply carries the address and signature under onchainAttestation. A lock link from a chat reply works too.

What a passing check means:

• An Intel TDX enclave received your exact ciphertext and signed for it.
• The receipt is on Solana, so nobody can quietly edit it later.
• The signing key is bound into the enclave's per-request quote, so an impostor cannot sign in its place.

What it does not mean:

• The Solana program stores the receipt fields without checking the signature. Your browser checks the signature.
• It does not verify Intel's signature chain. Check 1, step 3 covers that.

Verify one receipt by hand

Read the receipt with GET /attestation/by-tx/<signature>. Rebuild the signed bytes: "SOLR-ATTEST-v2", the SHA-256 of the ciphertext, the enclave sealing key, the nonce, your ephemeral key, then the model and provider names with one length byte each. Verify the 64-byte signature (enclaveSigR plus enclaveSigS) against enclavePubkey with any Ed25519 library.

The per-request quote in a /tee/process reply binds both enclave keys: its reportData is sha256(X25519 key || ed25519 key), wrapped the same way as above, sha512("app-data:" || reportData).

Read more