Verify an encryption proof
Paste the lock link from a private chat reply and watch the check pass in your browser. Then compare the live enclave key with the signed hardware note.
The question
"Solrouter says my message was handled inside a sealed computer. How do I know that is true?"
You do not have to trust the claim. Every private reply comes with a receipt. The receipt lives on the Solana blockchain, and your browser can check it. This page has two checks. The first takes ten seconds. The second takes one click.
Check 1: the receipt for one reply
When you send a message with Maximum Privacy Mode on, or through the Privacy SDK, the sealed computer (the enclave) signs a short receipt. The receipt says: "I received this exact scrambled message." Solrouter then writes the receipt to Solana. Solrouter cannot write a valid receipt on its own, because the signing key exists only inside the enclave.
In the chat app, every private reply shows a lock icon. Click it and copy the link. Paste the link below. You can also paste the receipt address, the transaction signature, or the 64-character hash of your scrambled prompt.
Paste a Solana Explorer link, the Light attestation address, or the 64-character encrypted-prompt hash. We fetch the on-chain record and verify the enclave’s signature in your browser — nothing is sent anywhere except the public read endpoint.
What a passing check means:
- A real Intel TDX enclave received your exact scrambled message and signed for it.
- The receipt is on Solana, so nobody can quietly edit it later.
- The signing key is named inside the enclave's hardware note (the attestation), so an impostor cannot sign in its place.
What it does not mean:
- It does not prove that the Solana program checked the signature. The program stores the receipt fields; your browser checks the signature.
- It does not verify Intel's full signature chain on the hardware note. Check 3 below covers that.
Check 2: the live enclave key
Your device encrypts every private message to the enclave's public key. This check confirms that the published key is the one named in the live hardware note.
/tee/public-key and /tee/attestation from your browser.In words
- Your browser fetches the published public key and the live hardware note from
api.solrouter.com. - It computes the fingerprint (SHA-256) of the key.
- It compares that fingerprint with the
report_datafield inside the note. - A match means: the key you encrypt to belongs to this exact enclave, not to a machine in the middle.
The key changes on every reboot
The enclave makes a fresh key pair each time it starts. The private half never leaves the enclave. If you run this check on two days and see two keys, that is expected.
Check 3: the deep checks
These steps are for auditors and engineers. They use the same two endpoints plus Intel's tools.
Fetch the note and the key
curl https://api.solrouter.com/tee/public-key
curl https://api.solrouter.com/tee/attestationThe first call returns publicKey, publicKeySha256, algorithm, and teeType. The second returns teePublicKey, teePublicKeySha256, reportDataHex, tdxQuote, and generatedAt. Both answered on 2026-08-26 with teeType: "INTEL-TDX-PHALA".
Verify the quote signature
Run the tdxQuote.quote bytes through Intel DCAP tools or a compatible TDX verifier. This proves the note came from real Intel TDX hardware, not from a simulator.
Check the report_data binding
For GET /tee/attestation, report_data equals sha256(X25519 public key). For the per-request note inside a /tee/process response, report_data equals sha256(X25519 public key || ed25519 signing key). The two formulas are different on purpose: the second one also pins the key that signs receipts.
Verify one receipt by hand
Read the receipt with GET /attestation/by-tx/<signature>. Rebuild the signed bytes: "SOLR-ATTEST-v2", the SHA-256 of the scrambled prompt, the enclave sealing key, the nonce, your ephemeral key, then the model and provider names with one length byte each. Verify the 64-byte signature (enclaveSigR plus enclaveSigS) against enclavePubkey with any Ed25519 library.
Compare the program measurement (Soon)
A full audit compares the measurements inside the note with published reference values for Solrouter's enclave image. Solrouter does not publish those values yet. Until it does, these checks prove real hardware and correct key binding, but not which image is running.
Read more
What is a TEE?
The sealed room, in plain words.
TDX attestation
How the note is produced, both report_data formulas, and what a verifier can and cannot check today.
On-chain encryption proof
The receipt format, the signed byte layout, and who signs and pays.
Proof lookups
The four endpoints that read receipts.